THE APPLICATION OF THE RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY WITHIN THE LOBBYING PRACTICE
Adriana Liuba AHCIARLIU Kyriakidis
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Adriana Liuba AHCIARLIU Kyriakidis: National University of Political Studies and Public Administration Institutional
Law, Society & Organisations, 2018, issue 5 (2/2018), 105-110
The lobby activity is recognized as an action to influence the political decision making process. Lobby can be analyzed from the perspective of the game theory, as a sub-topic of rational choice theory. According to Neuman and Morgenstern (1953), an analysis of a game must take into account several criteria and their interdependencies: the categories of players, their strategies, the choices made, the chosen standard of behavior with impact probabilities and the expected results. Depending on these criteria the theory describes several types of games which could be applied to the lobby. The purpose of this article is to show through a comparative analysis how lobby can be described using the criteria of this political science theory.
Keywords: Decision making process; Game theory; Lobbying; Rational choice theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cmj:lawsor:y:2018:i:5:p:105-110
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