Why do people keep their promises? An overview of strategic commitment

Miranda del Corral ()

Revista Cuadernos de Economia, 2015

Abstract: Strategic commitments, such as promises and threats, pose several problems to the standard model of economic rationality: first, they can only arise when there is an incentive to free-ride; second, they need to be credible in order to manipulate the others' behaviour; third, once the commitment has succeeded, it is no longer in the agent's self-interest to fulfil her commitment. Why, then, do people keep their promises (and threats)? This paper reviews the literature concerning the problem of commitment within the scope of pro-sociality and cooperation, and examines two mechanisms that enable credibility and trust: reputation and social emotions. ***** Los compromisos estratégicos, tales como las promesas y las amenazas, son problemáticos para el modelo clásico de racionalidad económica: solo surgen cuando existe un incentivo para gorronear, necesitan ser creíbles para manipular el comportamiento de los demás, y una vez que esto sucede, su cumplimiento no es la mejor opción para el agente. ¿Por qué, entonces, cumple la gente sus promesas y amenazas? Este artículo ofrece una revisión bibliográfica del problema del compromiso desde la perspectiva de la prosocialidad y la cooperación, relacionándolo con la capacidad de la reputación y de las emociones sociales de generar credibilidad y confianza.

Keywords: Strategic commitment; economic rationality; pro-sociality; cooperation; social dilemmas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 C70 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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