Rationality, preferences and irregular war

Boris Salazar () and Maria Castillo ()

Colombian Economic Journal, 2003

Abstract: We suppose that civilians under threat prefer certain situations within a context of irregular war and endangered survival; they will prefer those situations associated with greater probabilities of survival. Using lexicographical preferences and belief systems, we have shown that civilians will choose not to remain in situations having a lower probability of survival. Linking into social networks allows for shorter deliberation processes, lower decision costs and faster convergence towards collective decision-making. Civilian displacement thus becomes the outcome of a rational decision-making procedure.

Keywords: Survival (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Rationality, preferences and irregular war (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000096:003415

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