Misuse of Institutions: Patterns and Causes

Leonid Polishchuk

The Journal of Comparative Economic Studies (JCES), 2008, vol. 4, 57-80

Abstract: Institutions are often misused, i.e. applied or resorted to for reasons which have little in common with their intended raison d'etre. This paper provides an insight into the origins and causes of institutional misuse and explores the political economy of this phenomenon. We present a typology of misuse of institutions and illustrate it by examples largely drawn from Russian realities. Causes of vulnerability of institution to misuse are discussed. It is argued that institutions are not protected from misuse at the grassroots due to unresolved collective action problem, whereas economic and political elite are either indifferent to misuse of institutions, or perpetrate such misuse by subverting market institutions for the purpose of rent extraction.

Keywords: institutions; political economy; legal reform; institutional capture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 O17 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cos:epaper:v:4:y:2008:p:57-80

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