Long-term incentives plans as an instrument of executives’ compensation policy in public banks in Poland

Piotr Urbanek ()
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Piotr Urbanek: University of Lodz

Ekonomia i Prawo, 2014, vol. 13, issue 1, 225-238

Abstract: Long-term incentives plans (LTIPs) are one of the commonly used tools of top executive’s compensation policy in financial sector institutions. It is a solution which, in accordance with theses formulated on the basis of agency theory, can solve the agency problem and manage conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. The experience of the recent financial crisis has shown that extensive use of this type of instruments in leading U.S. banks did not protect these institutions and their shareholders from the catastrophic losses. This paper evaluates such incentives programs in public banks in Poland. In particular, it demonstrates the types of LTIPs, their impact on the financial and operational risks, and the share of the managers’ compensation resulting from such programs in total compensation.

Keywords: compensation policy; banking sector; public banks in Poland (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpn:umkeip:v:13:y:2014:i:1:p:225-238

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