 Institutional inertia in crisis management and interest representation: the case of the European UnionAnna Zabkowicz ()
Ekonomia i Prawo, 2015, vol. 14, issue 3, 351-368 Abstract: The recent crisis is banking crisis at its roots. An opening observation says that as far as policy response in the EU in the shape of the banking union concerned the multi- governmental negotiations seem to have failed to change common law in relevant respects. The question is posed what reasons for such institutional inertia might be. The premise of the research is looking at lobbying activities of pan-European economic agents at European level, transnational banks included. Thus the paper draws from theoretical perspective offered by political economy. The review of empirical findings adds an observation that at time of introducing the banking union circumstances existed under which lobbying activities might have been intensified. The paper concludes that institutional inertia in the EU-response to the banking crisis can be explained by intensity and power of interest representation as confronted with a rather soft stance of major European institutions involved in decision-making process. Keywords: European banking union; europeanization of lobbying activities; theory of organized interests (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpn:umkeip:v:14:y:2015:i:3:p:351-368 Access Statistics for this article Ekonomia i Prawo is currently edited by Barbara Polszakiewicz and Jerzy Boehlke More articles in Ekonomia i Prawo from Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika |
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