Do coalition councillors grow rich faster? Quantitative analysis of asset declarations
Lukasz Wiktor Olejnik ()
Additional contact information
Lukasz Wiktor Olejnik: Warsaw School of Economics, National Bank of Poland
Ekonomia i Prawo, 2019, vol. 18, issue 1, 47-60
Motivation: To study factors affecting changes in the wealth of people performing the functions of members of voivodeship assemblies. Aim: To fill the existing research gap by conducting a quantitative analysis of data collected from asset declarations of all councillors of voivodeship assemblies in Poland from the 2010–2014 term, in particular an analysis of declared assets. Results: The analysis of data clearly indicates that councillors belonging to the coalition ruling a given assembly in a given term accumulate wealth faster that opposition councillors. More detailed results also imply that the results cannot be explained by differences in sex, age or place of work between councillors of the specific political parties. The reason of the higher pace of growth of assets of coalition councillors may be their access to official positions in the public sector or having well-paid jobs.
Keywords: political economics; asset declarations; rent-seeking; office-seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 R50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpn:umkeip:v:18:y:2019:i:1:p:47-60
Access Statistics for this article
Ekonomia i Prawo is currently edited by Barbara Polszakiewicz and Jerzy Boehlke
More articles in Ekonomia i Prawo from Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Miroslawa Buczynska ().