Unreliability of markets – collusion of players. Detection methods in the light of the competition policy

Sylwester Bejger ()
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Sylwester Bejger: Nicolaus Copernicus University

Ekonomia i Prawo, 2009, vol. 5, issue 1, 147-160

Abstract: This paper presents a review of a methodology of detection of overt or tacit collusion in the light of the modern competition policy based on the game theory. In this paper a consistent research procedure for identification and detection of collusion is proposed.

Keywords: competition policy; game theory; collusion of players (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/EiP.2009.010

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpn:umkeip:v:5:y:2009:i:1:p:147-160

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