Game Theory and Institutions

Bernard Walliser

Cahiers d’économie politique / Papers in Political Economy, 2003, issue 44, 165-179

Abstract: The genesis of institutions can be treated by game theory, which is expressed at a sufficiently general level, considers direct relations among agents not mediated by former institutions and respects a sophisticated methodological individualism. In that framework, if interested not in the voluntary design of an institution but in the spontaneous arise of an institution, the last will be considered as an emergent structure of the game and practically as an equilibrium state of the game. Hence, the genesis of an institution parallels the genesis of an equilibrium, either by an educative process where the agents are able to induce it from their sole reasoning, or by an evolutionist process where it results from a learning mechanism foIIowed by the agents.

JEL-codes: C70 D00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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