Containing banking panics under tbe National Banking System: Discretion versus coordination

Laurent LE Maux

Cahiers d’économie politique / Papers in Political Economy, 2003, issue 45, 139-160

Abstract: Elmus Wicker draws a picture of banking panics under the National Banking System (NBS). He considers that the New York Clearing House (NYCH) was responsible for the aggravation of banking crises because of its incapacity to coordonnate banks and to equalize their reserves. A description of the structural characteristics of the NBS challenges this thesis. Moreover, a theory of the high-poweredmoney help to show why equalization of reserves is overwhelmed by NYCH loan certificates issuance. Our demonstration leads to a controversy, actually the opposition between discretion and coordination, and to the idea that the discretion logic excludes coordination log

JEL-codes: E32 E58 N11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/acheter_article.php?ID_ARTICLE=CEP_045_0139 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpo:journl:y:2003:i:45:p:139-160

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
142 rue du faubourg Saint-Martin. 75010 Paris, France.

Access Statistics for this article

Cahiers d’économie politique / Papers in Political Economy is currently edited by Claire Pignol

More articles in Cahiers d’économie politique / Papers in Political Economy from L'Harmattan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Carlos Andrés Vasco Correa ().