Individual and Self-Interest in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations

Stefano Fiori

Cahiers d’économie politique / Papers in Political Economy, 2005, issue 49, 19-31

Abstract: The aim of this essay is to describe the concept of self-interest and show how it relates to the idea of the individual as an economic agent, focusing only on Smith's Wealth of Nations. Self-interest is analysed from three different perspectives that highlight its conceptual complexity. The implication of the analysis is that modification must be made to the view that self-interest is a homogeneous and transparent principle, able to guide individuals' actions, and characterized by a set of features commonly shared by the majority.

JEL-codes: B12 B31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/acheter_article.php?ID_ARTICLE=CEP_049_0019 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpo:journl:y:2005:i:49:p:19-31

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
142 rue du faubourg Saint-Martin. 75010 Paris, France.

Access Statistics for this article

Cahiers d’économie politique / Papers in Political Economy is currently edited by Claire Pignol

More articles in Cahiers d’économie politique / Papers in Political Economy from L'Harmattan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Carlos Andrés Vasco Correa ().