The theory of bounded reflexivity. A contribution to the debate between the Economics of Conventions and the Regulation Theory

Franck Bessis

Cahiers d’économie politique / Papers in Political Economy, 2008, issue 54, 27-56

Abstract: This article develops an action theory which explains the dynamics of rules. This theory emphasises two kinds of limitation. First, agents can only recognize the constructed dimension of rules under specific conditions. Second, agents question their beliefs without ever completely freeing themselves from these beliefs. This answer provides the framework to a general action theory potentially common to the Economics of Conventions and to the Regulation Theory. This theory deals with the orders of worth as well as balances of power. It reconciles rationally planned action with spontaneous adjustments as two moments of the same reversible process of rules' construction.

JEL-codes: A12 B52 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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