L’autorité ne fait pas le contrat de travail: Une critique du modèle de Simon (1951)
Camille Chaserant ()
Cahiers d’économie politique / Papers in Political Economy, 2010, issue 58, 61-81
Continental Law defines the employment contract by the “subordination” of the employee to the employer. Since Simon (1951), economics defines authority as the opportunity for the employer to postpone the selection of the tasks the employee should perform. These definitions do not fit. Using the framework of option pricing in order to interpret Simon’s model, this paper shows that the economic concept of the employment contract is a spot contract paired with a call option on the employee’s tasks. Therefore, the economic formalization of the employment contract does not implement what lawyers define as an employment relationship.
Keywords: authority; subordination; employment contract; option value; renegotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 K31 G12 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpo:journl:y:2010:i:58:p:61-81
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