APPROPRIATION IN A COMPETITIVE THEORY OF VALUE

Louis Makowski () and Joseph Ostroy

Cahiers d’économie politique / Papers in Political Economy, 2012, issue 63, 25-76

Abstract: Two perspectives on the price system are examined, as a method of valuation represented by Walrasian equilibrium and as a means of appropriation represented by “perfectly competitive equilibrium.” The stronger requirements of perfectly competitive equilibrium emphasize that valuation is driven by appropriation. Similarities between the full appropriation property of perfectly competitive equilibrium and efficient incentive compatible mechanism design are demonstrated.

Keywords: marginalism; marginal product of an individual; appropriation; incentive compatibility; Walrasian equilibrium; perfectly competitive equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B21 D50 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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