Compétition électorale et partage des pouvoirs dans un Etat fédéral

Pierre Simard

Canadian Public Policy, 1991, vol. 17, issue 4, 409-416

Abstract: This article discusses the impact of electoral competition on the relations between the different levels of government in a federal State. It examines the strategies of two levels of government, national and local, during a constitutional revision process on the new division of powers. The author shows how the perspective of a fundamental change in the division of powers in Canada can shape the strategy of opposing political groups. Their analysis suggests that, in order to minimize risks of electoral defeat, the Canadian federal government could have the incentive to abandon Quebec in favor of the preferences of the Canadian citizens outside Quebec.

Date: 1991
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