Government Deficits, Political Inefficiency, and Fiscal Reconstruction in Japan

Takero Doi, Toshihiro Ihori () and Hiroki Kondo ()
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Toshihiro Ihori: Department of Economics, University of Tokyo
Hiroki Kondo: Department of Econmics, Shinshu University

Annals of Economics and Finance, 2002, vol. 3, issue 1, 169-183

Abstract: We investigate the behavior of government deficits and fiscal reconstruction movement in Japan both theoretically and empirically. We first develop a dynamic framework of fiscal reconstruction process using the dynamic game theory among various interest groups. The distribution of a tax increase, that is, contribution of taxes to reducing public debt and raising privileges, depends on the political efficiency of lobbying activities. We also investigate empirically the relationship between the political inefficiency and the outcome of fiscal reconstruction process in the Japanese (national) general account.

Keywords: Government deficits; Fiscal reconstruction; Political inefficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H62 H80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2002:v:3:i:1:p:169-183

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