Bargaining and Destructive Power

Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin
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Partha Dasgupta: University of Cambridge

Annals of Economics and Finance, 2007, vol. 8, issue 2, 217-227

Abstract: We explore the effect that the power to destroy the feasible set has on two-person bargaining outcomes.

Keywords: Bargaining; Axioms; Destruction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2007:v:8:i:2:p:217-227

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