Bidders¡¯ Risk Preferences in Discriminative Auctions

Yonghong Long
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Yonghong Long: Institute for Advanced Study, Wuhan University

Annals of Economics and Finance, 2009, vol. 10, issue 1, 215-223

Abstract: We study multiple unit Discriminative auctions when the bidders share logconcave utility functions and investigate the effects of bidders risk preferences on their bid functions when all bidders share a common utility function and when the bidders exhibit different risk preferences. We extend the existing findings from single unit auctions to multiple unit Discriminative auctions, from concave utility functions to log-concave utility functions, and from identical preference to different preferences.

Keywords: Auction; Bid function; Risk preference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2009:v:10:i:1:p:215-223

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