Categorical Segregation from a Game Theoretical Approach

Antoni Rubí-Barceló ()

Annals of Economics and Finance, 2013, vol. 14, issue 1, 85-120

Abstract: This paper exploits a coalition formation game with incomplete information to illustrate the causal relationship between categorical thinking and segregation. This causality was suggested by Fryer and Jackson (2008). The present model shows how societies can be segregated even when its self-interested members have no a priori motivation to discriminate by social identity; consequently, this paper supports the argument that segregation may not be malevolent in origin.

Keywords: Categorization; Segregation; Incomplete information; Cooperative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 J15 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2013:v:14:i:1:rubi-barcelo

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