Cognitive Ability and Cooperation: Evidence from the Public Goods Experiments
Su Zhang (),
Wei Gao and
Binbin Fan
Additional contact information
Su Zhang: School of Economics, Central University of Finance and Economics
Wei Gao: School of Economics, Central University of Finance and Economics
Binbin Fan: School of Finance, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Annals of Economics and Finance, 2015, vol. 16, issue 1, 43-68
Abstract:
The most important unanswered question in evolutionary biology, and more generally in the social sciences, is how cooperative behavior evolved. What it takes to bring out our cooperative spirit is a scientific puzzle that is driv- ing basic scientific research and shaping the future of science. By using the public goods game model, we designed four types of experiments, namely, non-punishment (NP), free punishment (FP), cost punishment (CP), and ex- ternal punishment (EP) experiment, to test the hypothesis that people with higher cognitive abilities have internalized a higher tendency of cooperation. We found that people with higher cognitive abilities are more willing to sacri- fice private gain for the public good in FP, CP, and EP experiment; They also imposed more "pro-social punishment" (spending time and energy to punish unfair actions, even though there’s nothing to be gained by these actions for themselves), and less "antisocial punishment" (punishing the high contributors as much as they punished the low contributors).
Keywords: Cognitive ability; Pro-social punishment; Antisocial punishment; Cooperative gain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A10 C70 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://down.aefweb.net/AefArticles/aef160103Zhang.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2015:v:16:i:1:zhang
Access Statistics for this article
Annals of Economics and Finance is currently edited by Heng-fu Zou
More articles in Annals of Economics and Finance from Society for AEF Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Qiang Gao ().