Mutual Fund Fee Structures and Broker Compensation
Lonnie Bryant (),
Maureen Butler and
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Lonnie Bryant: The University of Tampa Finance Department
Maureen Butler: The University of Tampa
Zhongling Cao: The University of Tampa
Annals of Economics and Finance, 2018, vol. 19, issue 1, 197-211
The mutual fund fee structure varies substantially across funds, a major variable being whether a contract imposes a fixed fee or marginal fee structure. This paper examines how the use of a fee structure affects broker compensation, investor investment decisions and broker benefits. Theory suggests that marginal fee contracts are the results of either economies of scale or non-linear fund performance. The intent of this study is to understand if the fee structure framing has a significant economic effect on broker compensations. Furthermore, to understand if fund inflows as well as fund performance are directly influenced by fee structure.
Keywords: mutual fund; broker; governance; fees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G2 G3 J3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2018:v:19:i:1:bryant:butler:cao
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