 Limiting End-user Piracy - The Role of Private and Public Anti-Piracy MeasureYuanzhu Lu () and Sougata Poddar () Annals of Economics and Finance, 2019, vol. 20, issue 1, 181-197 Abstract: We study when the original product developer makes costly investment to deter end-user piracy in a given regime of IPR protection. We find that when the consumers' tastes are sufficiently diverse and IPR protection is weak, only then it is profitable for the product developer to tolerate piracy. In all the other cases, it is profitable to deter, unless piracy is blockaded by strong IPR protection. The relationship between the optimal deterrence level from the product developer (private anti-piracy measure) and the degree of IPR protection in the economy (public anti-piracy measure) can be monotonic or non-monotonic. The private optimal deterrence level generally increases with the quality of the pirated good except when consumers' tastes are sufficiently diverse and the quality of the pirated good is sufficiently high. Public antipiracy measure unambiguously reduces piracy. Keywords: IPR protection; Private copyright protection; Piracy rate; Product quality; End-user piracy (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2019:v:20:i:1:lupoddar Access Statistics for this article Annals of Economics and Finance is currently edited by Heng-fu Zou More articles in Annals of Economics and Finance from Society for AEF Contact information at EDIRC. |
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