A simple isochore model evidencing regulation risk

J. Lévy Véhel

Annals of Actuarial Science, 2018, vol. 12, issue 2, 233-248

Abstract: In this note, we provide a simple example of regulation risk. The idea is that, in certain situations, the very prudential rules (or, rather, some of them) imposed by the regulator in the framework of the Basel II/III Accords or Solvency II directive are themselves the source of a systemic risk. The instance of regulation risk that we bring to light in this work can be summarised as follows: wrongly assuming that prices evolve in a continuous fashion when they may in fact display large negative jumps, and trying to minimise Value at Risk (VaR) under a constraint of minimal volume of activity leads in effect to behaviours that will maximise VaR. Although much stylised, our analysis highlights some pitfalls of model-based regulation.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:anacsi:v:12:y:2018:i:02:p:233-248_00

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