Merging Schemes: An Economic Analysis of Defined Benefit Pension Scheme Merger Criteria

Charles Sutcliffe

Annals of Actuarial Science, 2006, vol. 1, issue 2, 203-220

Abstract: The conditions under which pension schemes merge is an important issue which has been under-researched. Mergers can affect the strength of the sponsor's covenant and the balance of power between the trustees and the sponsor, as well as the deficit or the surplus of the receiving scheme and its funding ratio. This paper sets out two financial criteria to be met by any pension scheme merger: no profit or loss on merging with another scheme; and no dilution of the funding ratio. After defining a merger basis for valuing the assets and liabilities, and allowing for adjustments to the funding ratio via side receipts and payments; it is shown that, whether or not these criteria are met, depends on the state of the financial markets.

Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Merging Schemes: An Ecomomic Analysis of Defined Benefit Pension Scheme Merger Criteria (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:anacsi:v:1:y:2006:i:02:p:203-220_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Annals of Actuarial Science from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().