Optimal Insurance Coverage under Bonus-Malus Contracts

Jon Holtan

ASTIN Bulletin, 2001, vol. 31, issue 1, 175-186

Abstract: The paper analyses the questions: Should – or should not – an individual buy insurance? And if so, what insurance coverage should he or she prefer? Unlike classical studies of optimal insurance coverage, this paper analyses these questions from a bonus-malus point of view, that is, for insurance contracts with individual bonus-malus (experience rating or no-claim) adjustments. The paper outlines a set of new statements for bonus-malus contracts and compares them with corresponding classical statements for standard insurance contracts. The theoretical framework is an expected utility model, and both optimal coverage for a fixed premium function and Pareto optimal coverage are analyzed. The paper is an extension of another paper by the author, see Holtan (2001), where the necessary insight to – and concepts of – bonus-malus contracts are outlined.

Date: 2001
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