Competition-Originated Cycles and Insurance Strategies

Vsevolod K. Malinovskii

ASTIN Bulletin, 2010, vol. 40, issue 2, 797-843

Abstract: An insurance company entering the property and liability insurance market at the high point of the insurance cycle may decide to slash premiums to gain an advantageous market share. Such aggressive intrusion may call forth a concerted industry response, producing a severe decline in the insurance market price. This can ruin some companies, and agrees with the observation that the insurance cycles are correlated with clustered insolvencies. This paper addresses a quantitative analysis of competition-originated cycles; it explores an interplay of rational aggressive and defensive strategies in the multi-period Lundberg-type controlled risk model.

Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:astinb:v:40:y:2010:i:02:p:797-843_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in ASTIN Bulletin from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().