Public issues or issue publics? The distribution of genuine political attitudes
Yannick Dufresne and
Catherine Ouellet
Behavioural Public Policy, 2021, vol. 5, issue 3, 279-300
Abstract:
There is an inherent conflict between the political marketing model of humans and pioneering theories in electoral behavior research. While political marketing logic implies an issue-based and highly volatile voting behavior, voting theories conventionally assume that positional issues have little effect on how individuals vote, and so parties have little incentive to develop issue-based electoral strategies. However, few people would challenge the role that marketing now plays in the modern campaign process. How can we reconcile these theories? This paper revisits the role and impact of positional issues on voting behavior by testing whether specific issues affect different subgroups of voters as contended by the ‘issue-public’ theory. The results show that previous models underestimate issue voting. Once measurement accuracy is improved and the salience-based heterogeneity of issue effects is taken into consideration, positional issues have non-negligible effects on individual vote choice. Furthermore, salience-based heterogeneity is shown to explain better the variation in issue voting than heterogeneity based on political sophistication.
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:bpubpo:v:5:y:2021:i:3:p:279-300_1
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