Some challenges to the new paternalism

Julian Le Grand

Behavioural Public Policy, 2022, vol. 6, issue 1, 160-171

Abstract: Behavioural public policy analysts have examined cases of individuals’ failures of reason or judgement to attain their ends and have used these to justify ‘means’ paternalism: a form of government intervention that tries to save individuals from the consequences of those reasoning failures and to enable them better to achieve those ends. This has been challenged on a number of grounds, including too great a focus on choice-preserving interventions such as nudges, the privileging of future preferences over current ones and the possibility of state failures as damaging to individual well-being as the original reasoning failure. This paper summarizes the principal arguments in favour of means paternalism and then addresses these challenges.

Date: 2022
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