Distributive Justice and the Rules of the Corporation: Partial Versus General Equilibrium Analysis

John Beck ()

Business Ethics Quarterly, 2005, vol. 15, issue 3, 355-362

Abstract: Progressives have advocated reforms of rules governing corporations to achieve greater distributive justice, but Maitland (2001) has argued that corporate rules are distributively neutral and that changing the rules will have no long run impact on distributive justice. These different conclusions stem from the use of two different methods of economic analysis, partial equilibrium and general equilibrium models. A change in the rules governing corporations in a “large” sector of the economy is appropriately analyzed using a general equilibrium analysis, supporting the conclusion that changes in the rules may affect distributive justice in the long run. However, a partial equilibrium analysis of a change in the rules of corporations affecting a “small” part of the economy such as a single firm or even all firms in a small state supports the claim that such changes cannot affect distributive justice.

Date: 2005
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