On the Division of Moral Labour for Human Rights Between States and Corporations: A Reply to Hsieh

Denis G. Arnold

Business and Human Rights Journal, 2017, vol. 2, issue 2, 311-316

Abstract: In a series of previous articles I have defended the claim that there are robust, theoretical justifications for concluding that corporations have human rights obligations and that those obligations are distinct from the larger set of human rights obligations that are properly attributed to states. Hsieh claims that corporations do not have human rights obligations. In this reply it is argued that even if one takes what Hsieh refers to as an ‘institutional approach’ to understanding the human rights obligations of states, corporations are nonetheless properly understood to have human rights obligations regarding those with whom they interact, such as workers, customers and community members.

Date: 2017
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