Keeping score on congress: explaining variations in interest group ratings of US senators

Daniel E. Chand and William D. Schreckhise

Business and Politics, 2013, vol. 15, issue 3, 401-433

Abstract: We adopt a novel use for an old type of data – interest group scorecards – to explore the impact business organizations have on the political process. By aggregating congressional scorecards, we can develop a sense of how satisfied groups are with the US Congress as a whole. To do this, we generate interest group-level ratings of the US Senate derived from individual-level ratings of each senator. We find business groups tend to give higher aggregated scores relative to other types of groups, suggesting business organizations more often get what they want form Congress, which in turn, illuminates the importance of these groups in the political process. We also find that well-funded “niche” organizations tend to show higher levels of satisfaction with senators than larger groups with broad public missions.

Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:buspol:v:15:y:2013:i:03:p:401-433_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Business and Politics from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().