The strange case of pluralist lobbying in a corporatist setting: Defending Western business interests in China
Stefanie Weil
Business and Politics, 2018, vol. 20, issue 1, 70-97
Abstract:
E.U. and U.S. businesses in China are actively shaping the business environment according to their interests. As a state-corporatist framework is applied, the question arises as to how Western businesses go about lobbying China's policies. This article provides insights on what kind of lobbying tools Western interest groups apply to actively influence China's party state. Drawing on a large data set of lobbying actions toward indigenous innovation policies, this article aims to demonstrate that China's political system is receptive to influence from the outside. The argument builds on evidence showing that China's state corporatist system provides some leeway for pluralist lobbying strategies. It is hypothesized that Western interest groups are not completely co-opted by China's state-corporatist system, which increases the number of membership driven lobbying strategies. As Western groups stand outside the system, they are expected to devote their lobbying efforts to the international level. Specifically, this article analyzes how constrained access in domestic China affects transnational venue shopping versus domestic strategies.
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:buspol:v:20:y:2018:i:01:p:70-97_00
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