The Cost of Wrongdoing to Bystander Firms

Minjung Lee, Mina Lee and Seung-Hyun Lee

Business and Politics, 2023, vol. 25, issue 3, 215-250

Abstract: We argue that a taken-for-granted category gives way to a new category when strategic behavior becomes stigmatized. As a result, even bystander firms that have engaged in similar strategic behavior, such as lobbying, will be penalized by their association with the culpable strategic behavior. The extent of their association with the culpable behavior will determine the level of punishment they receive. However, if a trustworthy third party administers a corrective measure, the affected firms can regain their lost legitimacy. The extent of their restoration is proportional to the amount of legitimacy that was lost. We provide empirical evidence for this argument by analyzing the Jack Abramoff case, one of the most notorious corrupt lobbying cases in US history. We find that bystander firms were penalized by shareholders when the corrupt lobbying was revealed. Furthermore, the penalty was more severe for bystander firms that engaged in more lobbying activities and hired more revolving-door lobbyists. We also find that the subsequent legal remedy helped the bystander firms that were penalized the most to recover the most from their losses. We confirm the theoretical notion using the Enron case as well.

Date: 2023
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