Constituency-based Lobbying as Corporate Political Strategy: Testing an Agency Theory Perspective

Michael D. Lord

Business and Politics, 2000, vol. 2, issue 3, 289-308

Abstract: This study explores sources of variation in the efficacy of constituency building as corporate political strategy. The theoretical focus is on the persistent agency problems inherent in the principal-agent relationship between constituents and legislators. Analysis of data from key congressional respondents indicates that the nature of these agency problems significantly determines the relative effectiveness of corporate constituency building as a means to influence legislative decisionmaking. Corporate constituency building appears to be more effective for influencing legislators' voting behavior than for influencing the specific content of legislation; more effective in the House than the Senate; contingent on party affiliation; contingent on the types of feedback corporate stakeholders use to communicate with legislative offices; contingent on the types of corporate stakeholders involved. This paper discusses these findings in the context of the existing literature and makes suggestions for further inquiry into the use, efficacy, and evolution of constituency-based lobbying as corporate political strategy.

Date: 2000
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