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HOW TO PLAY GAMES? NASH VERSUS BERGE BEHAVIOUR RULES

Pierre Courtois, Rabia Nessah () and Tazdaït, Tarik
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Tarik Tazdaït

Economics and Philosophy, 2015, vol. 31, issue 1, 123-139

Abstract: Assuming that in order to best achieve their goal, individuals adapt their behaviour to the game situation, this paper examines the appropriateness of the Berge behaviour rule and equilibrium as a complement to Nash. We define a Berge equilibrium and explain what it means to play in this fashion. We analyse the rationale of individuals playing in a situational manner, and establish an operational approach that describes the circumstances under which the same individual might play in one fashion versus another.

Date: 2015
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Related works:
Working Paper: How to Play Games? Nash versus Berge Behavior Rules (2012)
Working Paper: How to play the games? Nash versus Berge behavior rules (2011) Downloads
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