HAUSMAN AND MCPHERSON ON WELFARE ECONOMICS AND PREFERENCE SATISFACTION THEORIES OF WELFARE: A CRITICAL NOTE

Alexander F. Sarch

Economics and Philosophy, 2015, vol. 31, issue 1, 141-159

Abstract: Hausman and McPherson defend welfare economics by claiming that even if welfare does not consist in preference satisfaction, preferences still provide good, if fallible, evidence of welfare. I argue that this strategy does not yet fully solve the problems for welfare economics stemming from the preference satisfaction theory of welfare. More work is needed to show that our self-interested preferences are sufficiently reliable, or in some other sense our best, evidence of well-being. Thus, my aim is to identify the challenges that remain and clarify what additional work is needed before Hausman and McPherson's defence of welfare economics succeeds.

Date: 2015
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