PATERNALISMS AND NUDGES

Danny Scoccia

Economics and Philosophy, 2019, vol. 35, issue 1, 79-102

Abstract: Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (T/S) have defended ‘nudges’ aimed at smoking, overeating, etc. as a ‘means’ paternalism that leaves its targets ‘better off as judged by themselves’. Their libertarian critics have charged that these behaviours are often perfectly rational and that the nudges would ‘impose’ on their targets ‘ends’ that they reject. This paper argues that whether or not the behaviours are rational is difficult to say, but the critics are right in claiming that T/S fail to take seriously their targets’ true preferences. This is evident, in particular, in Sunstein's recent reply to an ‘autonomy objection’ to nudging. The upshot is that the nudging paternalism T/S support cannot be defended as a means paternalism that is deferential to its targets’ own ends or values. The only way to defend it is via a ‘prudential’ paternalism that, given the preferences of many of its targets, will often be ‘ends’ paternalism.

Date: 2019
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