A new puzzle in the social evaluation of risk
Marc Fleurbaey and
Stéphane Zuber
Economics and Philosophy, 2022, vol. 38, issue 3, 450-465
Abstract:
We highlight a new paradox for the social evaluation of risk that bears on the evaluation of individual well-being rather than social welfare, but has serious implications for social evaluation. The paradox consists in a tension between rationality, respect for individual preferences, and a principle of informational parsimony that excludes individual risk attitudes from the assessment of riskless situations. No evaluation criterion can satisfy these three principles. This impossibility result has implications for the evaluation of social welfare under risk, especially when the preferences of some individuals are not known. It generalizes existing impossibility results, while relying on very weak principles of social rationality and respect for individual preferences. We explore the possibilities opened by weakening each of our three principles and discuss the advantages and drawbacks of these different routes.
Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)
Related works:
Working Paper: A new puzzle in the social evaluation of risk (2022) 
Working Paper: A new puzzle in the social evaluation of risk (2022) 
Working Paper: A new puzzle in the social evaluation of risk (2022) 
Working Paper: A new puzzle in the social evaluation of risk (2020) 
Working Paper: A new puzzle in the social evaluation of risk (2020) 
Working Paper: A new puzzle in the social evaluation of risk (2020) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:38:y:2022:i:3:p:450-465_6
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Economics and Philosophy from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().