Are long-lived persons utility monsters?
Gregory Ponthiere
Economics and Philosophy, 2025, vol. 41, issue 2, 376-394
Abstract:
Nozick’s ‘utility monster’ is often regarded as impossible, because one life cannot be better than a large number of other lives. Against that view, I propose a purely marginalist account of utility monster defining the monster by a higher sensitivity of well-being to resources (instead of a larger total well-being), and I introduce the concept of collective utility monster to account for resource predation by a group. Since longevity strengthens the sensitivity of well-being to resources, large groups of long-lived persons may, if their longevity advantage is sufficiently strong, fall under the concept of collective utility monster, against moral intuition.
Date: 2025
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Working Paper: Are long-lived persons utility monsters? (2024) 
Working Paper: Are Long-Lived Persons Utility Monsters? (2022) 
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