Imperfect Choice and Self-Stabilizing Rules

Ronald A. Heiner

Economics and Philosophy, 1989, vol. 5, issue 1, 19-32

Abstract: A recent paper by David Levy (1987) focuses on “utility enhancing consumption constraints.” Levy concludes by noting that his analysis stays within standard utility maximizing theory, in contrast to my analysis of rule-governed behavior (Heiner, 1983, 1985a, 1985b, 1986, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c) which allows imperfect decisions that don't always maximize utility. I wish to show how our two theories can be integrated, thereby representing complementary, rather than conflicting, explanations. In the process, I argue that imperfect decisions are an essential factor in the stability of any rule that constrains freedom of choice. I also briefly discuss certain intrinsic problems with achieving “self-stabilizing” rules applied to moral teachings.

Date: 1989
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:5:y:1989:i:01:p:19-32_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics and Philosophy from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().