Making Interpersonal Comparisons Coherently

Martin Barrett and Daniel Hausman

Economics and Philosophy, 1990, vol. 6, issue 2, 293-300

Abstract: Many ethical theories, including in particular consequentialist moral the ories, require comparisons of the amount of good possessed or received by different people. In the case of some goods, such as monetary income, wealth, education, or health, such comparisons are relatively unproblematic. Even in the case of such goods there may be serious empirical measurement problems, but there appear to be no difficulties in principle. Thus Cooter and Rappoport (1984) maintained that there was no serious difficulty of making interpersonal utility comparisons for an earlier generation of economists who regarded utility as an index of “material welfare.”

Date: 1990
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