Collective action for watershed management: field experiments in Colombia and Kenya
Juan-Camilo Cardenas,
Luz Angela Rodriguez and
Nancy Johnson
Environment and Development Economics, 2011, vol. 16, issue 3, 275-303
Abstract:
The collective action problem around water use and management involves solving both the problems of provision and appropriation. Cooperation in the provision can be affected by the rival nature of appropriation and the asymmetries in access. We report the results of two field experiments conducted in Colombia and Kenya. The irrigation game was used to explore the provision and appropriation decisions under asymmetric or sequential appropriation, complemented by a voluntary contribution mechanism experiment which looks at provision decisions under symmetric appropriation. The overall results were consistent with the patterns of previous studies: the zero contribution hypotheses is rejected whereas the most effective institution to increase cooperation was face-to-face communication, although we find that communication works much more effectively in Colombia than in Kenya. We also find that the asymmetric appropriation did reduce cooperation, though the magnitude of the social loss and the effectiveness of alternative institutional options varied across sites.
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)
Related works:
Working Paper: Collective Action for Watershed Management: Field Experiments in Colombia and Kenya (2009) 
Working Paper: Collective Action forWatershed Management: Field Experiments in Colombia and Kenya (2009) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:endeec:v:16:y:2011:i:03:p:275-303_00
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Environment and Development Economics from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().