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Wildlife management, illegal hunting and conflicts. A bioeconomic analysis*

Anders Skonhoft () and Jan Tore Solstad

Environment and Development Economics, 1996, vol. 1, issue 2, 165-181

Abstract: The paper analyzes the conflict between illegal and legal exploitation of wildlife species in an East African context. In the model there are two agents, an agency managing a national park of fixed area and a group of local people living in the vicinity of the park. The park agency has the legal right to exploit the wildlife, while the local people hunt illegally. Because of the property rights, the park agency has incentives to invest in the stock of wildlife, while the behaviour of the local people is steered by short-term considerations. The model is analyzed in two steps. Firstly, the market solution is studied. Next, the model is examined when user and property rights are given to the local people.

Date: 1996
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