Identification, Estimation, and Testing in Parametric Empirical Models of Auctions within the Independent Private Values Paradigm

Stephen Donald and Harry Paarsch

Econometric Theory, 1996, vol. 12, issue 3, 517-567

Abstract: Recent advances in the application of game theory to the study of auctions have spawned a growing empirical literature involving both experimental and field data. In this paper, we focus on four different mechanisms (the Dutch, English, first-price sealed-bid, and Vickrey auctions) within one of the most commonly used theoretical models (the independent private values paradigm) to investigate issues of identification, estimation, and testing in parametric structural econometric models of auctions.

Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:etheor:v:12:y:1996:i:03:p:517-567_00

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