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Partisan Bias in Blame Attribution: When Does it Occur?

Andrew Healy, Alexander G. Kuo and Neil Malhotra

Journal of Experimental Political Science, 2014, vol. 1, issue 2, 144-158

Abstract: How do citizens attribute blame in the wake of government failure? Does partisanship bias these attributions? While partisan cues may serve as useful guides when citizens are evaluating public policies, those cues are likely to be less informative and more distortionary when evaluating government performance regarding a crisis. We address these questions by examining blame attributions to government appointees for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. We implement an experimental design in a nationally representative survey that builds on previous work in two ways: (1) we manipulate party labels for the same officials in a real-world setting by considering appointees who were nominated at different times by presidents of different parties; and (2) we examine how domain relevance moderates partisan bias. We find that partisan bias in attributions is strongest when officials are domain relevant, a finding that has troubling implications for representative democracy.

Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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