A State Preference Model of Capital Gains Taxation

Edward A. Dyl

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1979, vol. 14, issue 3, 529-535

Abstract: Economists generally agree that a basic characteristic of a good tax is economic neutrality. That is, a tax should not influence economic behavior unless it was intentionally designed to produce a specific effect. In this context, the economic effects of the current system of capital gains taxation in the United States have been the subject of considerable concern. Most researchers have concluded that the current system of capital gains taxation has an undesirable and destabilizing effect on the securities markets because the practices of taxing capital gains only when they are realized and, correspondingly, allowing tax deductions for capital losses only upon realization, presumably cause investors to defer the realization of capital gains and to accelerate the realization of capital losses. Based upon this behavioral assumption, many economists infer an effect on the securities markets.

Date: 1979
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:14:y:1979:i:03:p:529-535_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().