Abstract: Optimal Investment Financing Decisions and the Value of Confidentiality

Tim S. Campbell

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1979, vol. 14, issue 4, 669-669

Abstract: This paper presents a new explanation for the use of debt financing, particularly private debt, in addition to equity without relying on the existence of taxes or bankruptcy costs. The paper assumes that information about returns on investment projects is costly and subject to efficient specialization, so that managers of firms develop inside information not possessed by the market. Suppose the manager of a firm possesses such inside information about a new investment project and his objective is to act in the best interests of existing equity owners. If the information can be disclosed to the market without impairing the value of the project, he will do so. However, much information will be of a strategic nature where the value of the project depends upon confidentiality. Public financing of such projects without disclosing the information will mean that the excess value or surprise monopoly profits in the new project will be split between new and old owners.

Date: 1979
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