Discussion: Signaling, Information Content, and the Reluctance to Cut Dividends

Lemma W. Senbet

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1980, vol. 15, issue 4, 871-873

Abstract: Avner Kalay makes a point that managerial reluctance to cut dividends is a necessary condition for the existence of a signaling equilibrium in which dividends are employed as a signaling device. He argues, however, that the available empirical evidence is unable to confirm the reluctance to cut dividends. In particular, the well-known Lintner's (1956) partial adjustment model, which is often cited in support of the reluctance to cut dividends, is empirically indistinguishable from an alternative model which is devoid of such a reluctance. Kalay then conducts an alternative test, but it too leads to an inconclusive result on the issue.

Date: 1980
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:15:y:1980:i:04:p:871-873_01

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().