Negotiated versus Competitive Underwritings of Public Utility Bonds: Just One More Time

Frank Fabozzi () and Richard R. West

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1981, vol. 16, issue 3, 323-339

Abstract: Over the past decade, a number of papers [1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9] have explored the relative merits of negotiation versus competitive bidding in the underwriting of corporate bonds, particularly bonds issued by public utilities. Interest in this subject has been stimulated principally by an important public policy issue—namely, the SEC's posture vis a vis its Rule U–50. Originally promulgated in 1940, this rule required competitive bidding on certain classes of utility bonds. In 1974, however, it was “temporarily” suspended on the grounds that chaotic conditions in the market for these securities called for more flexibility in the way issues could be underwritten. While this suspension continues in effect, Rule U–50 could be reinstated at any time by the SEC.

Date: 1981
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