Implicit Contracts in the Japanese Bank Loan Market

Hiroshi Osano and Yoshiro Tsutsui ()

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1985, vol. 20, issue 2, 211-229

Abstract: The implicit contract theory explored by Azariadis [2] suggests that wage rigidity and underemployment are explained by the microeconomic optimizing behavior of each agent in the labor market. In this theory, the former phenomenon is interpreted as risk-sharing arrangements between firms and workers, whereas the latter may occur when workers have the opportunity to use leisure or unemployment insurance benefits.

Date: 1985
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